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Abstract
During the last decade, ‘information warfare’ has become a much-politicised term in 
Russian domestic and foreign affairs. This article sheds light on the conceptual roots 
that have been shaping this idea in the Russian academic, political, and public discourse. 
Moreover, the article points to the major actors leading the politicisation of  this idea 
by promoting narratives describing the so-called ‘Western information war against 
Russia’. In the context of  Russia’s contemporary attempts to re-establish itself  as a 
global power and Western fear and distress associated with Russian activities in the 
information domain, a grounded understanding of  the major conceptual narratives 
influencing Russian thinking about information warfare, as well as perspectives on 
how these narratives have been politicised, is of  paramount importance.
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An analysis of  the vast scope of  Russian conceptual and analytical literature on 
‘information warfare’ published over the last decades, shows that the main ideas can be 
divided into two general groups. One group of  writing focuses on information warfare 
as a set of  methods and techniques used to achieve power, capital, and public influence. 
This body of  literature analyses the different methods by which information is used for 
political or economic goals, generally claiming that: 
‘The methods of  Information War [...] are neutral, just like nuclear energy. 
Similar to nuclear technologies, the techniques of  Information War have a dual 
purpose: they can be used for good or for evil, offensive or defensive. [...] We 
meet them everywhere—in politics, economy and business, in the workplace and 
in everyday life.’1    
Proponents of  this approach see information warfare as a very old phenomenon—the 
manipulation of  information for achieving certain political, economic, or other goals. 
However, they claim that due to the processes of  globalisation and integration and the 
information revolution that have been taking place over recent decades, information 
wars have become a more prevalent and preferable way of  achieving political goals in 
international relations. By integrating various methods and techniques developed for 
use in politics and business, and combining the fields of  psychology, sociology, politics, 
marketing, and others, these scholars are attempting to develop a more clearly defined 
conceptual understanding of  information warfare in the 21st century as a general 
phenomenon prevalent in the political, social, and economic realities.2
The second body of  literature takes a more ideological stance, claiming that information 
warfare is a method explicitly used by the West to undermine Russia.3 On the one 
hand, proponents of  this approach agree with the general definition of  information 
warfare as a non-military method used to achieve political goals: ‘during the whole 
of  human history, Information Warfare has been the main tool of  global politics to 
achieve spiritual, political, financial and economic power in the world’.4 On the other, 
they claim that information warfare is a ‘subversive Western political technique’ that 
not only ‘allowed the West to destroy the Soviet Union’ but also ‘puts the dissolution of  
1 Tsyganov, V. and S. Bukharin, Informatsionnyye voyny v biznese i politike : Teoriya i metodologiya, (Moscow: 
Akademicheskiy Proyekt, 2007), pg. 11.
2 See Bukharin, S., Metody i tekhnologii informatsionnykh voyn, (Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, 2007); Vlasenko, 
I. and M. Kir'yanov, Informatsionnaya voyna: iskazheniye real'nosti, (Moscow: Kantsler, 2011); Rastorguyev, S., 
Informatsionnaya voyna. Problemy i modeli. Ekzistentsial'naya matematika, (Moscow: Akademicheskiy proyekt, 2006); 
Raskin, A. and I. Tarasov, ‘Informatsionnoe protivoborstvo v sovremennoy voyne’, Informatsionnye voyny, 
Vol. 4(32), 2014, pp. 2–6; Malkov, S. and S. Bilyuga, ‘Model ustoychivosti/destabilizatsii politiheskih sistem’, 
Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 1(33), 2015, pp. 7–18; Tsyganov, V. and S. Bukharin, Informatsionnyye voyny v biznese i 
politike.
3 See Panarin, I., Informatsionnaya Voyna I kommunikatsii, (Moscow: Goryachaya Liniya-Telekom, 2015); 
Filimonov, G., Kulturno-informatsionnie mekhanizmi vnewnei politiki SSHA, (Moscow: People’s Friendship University 
of  Russia (RUDN), 2012); Filimonov, G., N. Danyuk, and M. Urakov, Perevorot, (Saint Petersburg: Piter, 
2016); Pertsev, A., ‘Osobennosti informatsionnogo protiviborstva v sovremennikh usloviyakh’, Informatsionnye 
voyny, Vol. 2(34), 2015, pp. 33–37; Orlov, A., ‘Sistemnyi analis amrikanskogo kapitalizma kak factor vliyaniya 
na informatsionnuyu bezopasnost ssha i rossiiskoi federatsii na primere sobitii na Ukraine v 2013–2015gg’, 
Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 1(37), 2016, pp. 74–77. 
4 Panarin, I., Informatsionnaya Voyna I kommunikatsii, pg. 6.
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the Russian Federation on the [Western] agenda’.5 Analysing this body of  literature it 
is possible to identify three major theories that provide the main conceptual narratives 
for this approach to understanding information warfare: ‘subversion-war’ developed 
by Evgeny Messner, ‘net-centric war’ developed by Aleksandr Dugin, and ‘information 
warfare’ developed by Igor Panarin. 
These three independently developed, yet similar theories have successfully coexisted 
within Russian academic and analytical discourses since the late 1990s, politicising 
information warfare as a Western technique to subvert its adversaries. By conducting 
an in-depth empirical analysis of  academic and political discourses about information 
warfare in Russia, this article seeks to answer two main questions. The first question 
is concerned with the conceptual roots of  information warfare. The first part of  
this article will describe the three main theories that have been used to politicise the 
concept of  information warfare in Russia. The second question is concerned with the 
politicisation process itself. By analysing various actions taken by the Russian political 
establishment in the context of  the alleged information war waged by the West against 
Russia, and the reaction of  the Russian public to these actions, this article will argue that 
the politicisation of  information warfare has not been led explicitly by the Kremlin; 
it is, rather, a complicated and synergetic process involving the Russian government, 
Russian scholars, and the Russian public in general.
Information Warfare in Russian Academic Discourse 
Three concepts have dominated the Russian academic discourse on information 
warfare since the mid-1990s: Evgeny Messner’s ‘subversion-war’, Aleksandr Dugin’s 
‘net-centric war’, and Igor Panarin’s ‘information war’. While these concepts were 
independently developed and promoted, each of  them essentially describes the 
same phenomenon—the process of  undermining a legitimate government by 
manipulating the information domain in order to influence political elites and instil 
political dissent, separatism, and social strife within a given system.
Evgeny Messner—Subversion-War (Myatezhevoyna)6
Evgeny Eduardovich Messner was born on 3 September 1891 in the Kherson 
Governorate in the Southern Ukrainian region of  the Russian Empire. In 1912, after 
5 Prokhvatilov, V., ‘Ataka myslyashchey pautiny- metaprogrammirovaniye - organizatsionnoye oruzhiye 21 veka’, 
Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 1(13), 2010, pg. 73.
6 Before starting analysis of  the Messner’s concept of  myatezhevoyna, it is important to make several translation 
clarifications. Some Western (mainly East European) scholars have been translating myatezhevoyna as ‘mutiny-
war’. This translation, however, is incorrect, as ‘mutiny’ is an open rebellion against the authorities, especially 
by soldiers or sailors against their officers, and its Russian equivalent is bunt. The direct translation of myatezh’ 
is ‘insurgency’, and therefore the direct translation of  myatezhevoyna from Russian to English is ‘a war by 
insurgency’ or ‘insurgency-war’. These translations, however, are also misleading for two main reasons. The 
first was given by Messner himself, who noticeably argued that there is a difference between myatezhevoyna 
and ‘guerrilla war’ (i.e. ‘insurgency-war’), as it describes a much wider phenomenon, and, in fact, ‘guerrilla 
war’ is only one possible way to wage myatezhevoyna. (Messner, 1971:8). The second reason myatezhevoyna 
cannot be translated as ‘insurgency-war’ is that from the analysis of  Messner’s works it becomes clear that 
by conceptualising myatezhevoyna, he implied an activity that intends to erode the adversary’s socio-cultural-
military cohesion—something that better suits the definition of  ‘subversion’ [podryvnaya deyatel'nost'] rather than 
‘insurgency’. For these reasons, in the following translations, Myatezh’ will be translated as ‘insurgency’, but 
myatezhevoyna as ‘subversion-war’.
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passing his final examinations at the Mikhailovsky Artillery School as an external 
student, Messner was stationed in his hometown Odessa and assigned to the 5th 
Battery of  the 15th Artillery Brigade as a Podporuchik [Second Lieutenant]. During 
the First World War, Messner swiftly climbed the military ladder, proving himself  to 
be a talented and daring officer. On 23 October 1916, already Stabs-Kapitan [Senior 
Lieutenant], Messner was sent to the Academic Courses at the Imperial Nicholas 
Military Academy . He successfully completed his courses among the top ten in his 
class. During the Russian Civil War he joined the White movement taking an active 
role in the fighting against the Red Army, most notably he was the last Chief  of  Staff  
of  the Kornilov Division of  General Wrangel’s Army. In November 1920, General 
Staff  Colonel Evgeny Messner left Russia with the last of  the ships that evacuated 
the defeated White forces from Crimea.7 
After leaving Russia, Messner moved to Belgrade where he took active part in the 
social and military-academic life of  the Russian émigrés there. His writings on 
military theory and tactics were widely published in several military periodicals by 
Russian communities abroad. After the beginning of  the Second World War, Messner 
continued to lecture at the Higher Military Courses in Belgrade, preparing officers 
for the Russian Corps, an armed force composed of  anti-Communist Russian 
émigrés in the Territory of  the Military Commander in Serbia.8 Until the spring 
of  1945 Messner served in the military-propaganda department of  the Wehrmacht 
‘South East’, where he led the Russian section and was an active supporter of  the 
establishment of  the Russian Liberation Army, also called the Vlasov Army—a 
group of  predominantly Russian forces that fought under German command. 
In March 1945 Messner became head of  the propaganda department in the First 
Russian National Army established under the command of  Russian-émigré General 
Boris Alexeyevich Smyslovsky-Holmston. The army capitulated in Lichtenstein in 
May 1945 and Messner emigrated to Argentina with his wife in the autumn of  1947.9
In Argentina, Messner continued his earlier work as a journalist, author, publisher, 
and military theorist. One of  his most prominent achievements was the establishment 
of  the South-American branch of  the Institute for the Research of  War and 
Peace in Buenos-Aires, named after General Professor Golovin. Until his death 
in 1974, Messner continued to publish works on political and security matters, as 
well as modern military history. While most of  his publications emphasised his 
interpretations of  ongoing political and military developments within the context of  
the Cold War, three of  his most prominent books—Lik Soveremennoy Voyni [The Face 
of  Contemporary War]; Myatezh—Imya Tret’yey Vseminoy [Subversion—The Name 
7 Messner, E., Posluzhnoy Spisok. Buenos Aires, 1972. First published as: Tereshchuk, A. (ed.), Yevgeniy 
Eduardovich Messner: Sud'ba Russkogo Ofitsera, (Saint-Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo 
Universiteta, 1997); Domnin, I., ‘Ot Pervoy mirovoy do “Tret'yey Vsemirnoy”, Zhiznennyy put' General'nogo 
shtaba polkovnika E. E. Messnera’, in Savinkin, A. (ed.) Khochesh' mira, pobedi myatezhevoynu!—Tvorcheskoye naslediye 
E. Messnera, Rossiyskiy Voyennyy Sbornik, Issue 21, (Moscow: Voyennyy Universitet, Russkiy Put', 2005). 
8 The Territory of  the Military Commander in Serbia was the official title of  the area of  the Kingdom of  
Yugoslavia that was placed under a military government of  occupation by the Wehrmacht following the 
invasion, occupation and dismantling of  Yugoslavia in April 1941.
9 Alexanrov, K., Armia Generala Vlasova, 1944–1945, (Moscow: Yauza Eskimo, 2006), pp. 182–184; Domnin, I., 
‘Ot Pervoy mirovoy do “Tret'yey Vsemirnoy”...’.
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of  the Third World War]; and Vseminaya Myatezhevoyna [The Worldwide Subversion-
War]—focused on the conceptualisation of  the next generation of  war, based on 
his personal experience and his interpretation of  the struggle between the West and 
Communism (the Soviet Union and China).10
Messner’s understanding of  political-military international affairs was highly influenced 
by the developing struggle between the post-World War Two superpowers—the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Conceptualising this new situation in the context 
of  an extreme clash of  ideologies on the one hand, and the possibility of  mutually 
assured destruction on the other, he argued that Trotsky’s description of  the 1918 
Treaty of  Brest-Litovsk—‘neither war nor peace’—could be said to apply globally 
after 1945.  At the conference in Potsdam, Messner argued that:
‘[T]he international situation was initially crafted by the formula “neither peace, 
nor war”, its most characteristic feature came from the extremely intense 
diplomatic struggle punctuated by outbreaks of  armed unrests and uprisings. 
It was called the “cold war”. It could equally have been foolishly called “hot 
diplomacy”. In this “neither war, nor peace” there were also rather “hot” 
military operations.’11
Messner tended to interpret what are commonly known as ‘proxy wars’ during the 
Cold War as a part of  a much bigger picture:
‘We have to stop thinking that war is when somebody is fighting and peace is 
when there is no fighting. The U.S.A., Australia, New Zealand, Philippines and 
Thailand are not in a state of  war against North Vietnam, but they are fighting 
against it. There is an armistice between North and South Koreas; however, 
they fight each other due to the initiative of  the North, through partisans 
on the demarcation line and violent students in Seoul. Israelis and Arabs are 
considered to be in an armistice, but they quite intensively fight each other. [...] 
It is possible [for the USSR and the USA] to negotiate about non-aggression or 
disarmament and simultaneously to fight: the U.S.S.R. fights against the U.S.A. 
by supplying weapons, instructors, money, [and] supplies to those who feud 
with America; and by subverting Americans within the United States.’12
10 Messner, E., Lik sovremennoy voyny, (Buenos Aires: South American Division of  the Institute for the Study of  
the Problems of  War and Peace named after Prof. General N.N. Golovin, 1959); Messner, E., Myatezh—Imya 
Tret'yey Vseminoy, (Buenos Aires: South American Division of  the Institute for the Study of  the Problems of  
War and Peace named after Prof. General N.N. Golovin, 1960); Messner, E., Vseminaya Myatezhevoyna, (Buenos 
Aires: South American Division of  the Institute for the Study of  the Problems of  War and Peace named after 
Prof  General N.N. Golovin, 1971).
11 Messner, Vseminaya Myatezhevoyna, p. 12.
12 Ibid., pg. 10.
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And since, according to Messner, open ‘classic’ warfare is impossible, the development 
of  a new type of  warfare was underway:
‘In previous wars, a military was breaking an enemy military. In the last war, 
a military was breaking an enemy military and its people. In the future war, a 
military and its people are going to break an enemy military and its people: 
people will be active participants of  war, and, maybe, even more active than the 
military. In previous wars the most important part was considered the conquest 
of  the territory. From now, it will be the conquest of  the souls in the enemy 
state.’13
And therefore:  
‘Today we have to reckon with the fact that there is no more division between 
the theatre of  war and the country at war; the sum total of  an enemies’ 
territory—this is [now] the theatre of  war. Today there is no division between 
the military and the population—all are participating in war with different 
gradations of  intensity and persistence: some fight openly, others secretly, 
some fight continuously, others only at a convenient opportunity. Today the 
regular army has lost its military monopoly...’14
And consequently:
‘[W]ars have merged with subversions, subversions with wars, creating a new 
form of  armed conflict, which we will call subversion-war, and in which the 
fighters are not so much the troops themselves, but rather public movements.’15
According to Messner, one of  the most distinguishing characteristics of  the 
subversion-war is the prominence of  the psychological/informational dimension of  
warfare:
‘This new phenomenon has to be considered from different perspectives, 
but the most important is psychological: if  in classic warfare the morale of  
standing armies was of  great importance, then in the current era of  nations 
in arms and violent popular movements, psychological factors have become 
dominant. A people’s army is a psychological organism, therefore a popular 
movement is a purely psychological phenomenon. A war of  military and 
popular movements—a subversion-war—is a psychological war.’16
Though, Messner assessed:
‘Classical diplomacy has been partly ousted by an aggressive diplomacy 
with subversive actions. Already now we have “half-wars”: Greece was 
fighting against Turkey by Grivas in Cyprus, African countries created 
legions to support an uprising in Algeria, i.e. to fight against France.  
13 Messner, Myatezh - Imya Tret'yey Vseminoy, pg. 43.
14 Messner, Lik sovremennoy voyny..., pg. 11.
15 Messner, Myatezh - Imya Tret'yey Vseminoy, pg. 5.
16 Ibid.
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Such “half-wars” are waged by partisans, “volunteers”, underground fighters, 
terrorists, saboteurs, wreckers and propagandists in the enemy country, and 
radio-propagandists [from the outside].’17
This characteristic, according to Messner, had become even more prominent:
‘People have stopped being passive observers and silent victims of  military 
struggles [...] A citizen of  a free country has gotten used to widespread 
opposition to the government. [...] This predisposes him to oppose the 
occupying power together with his own military, or [equally] to rise against the 
authority of  his country in union with another fighting party.’18
The total involvement of  a population, according to Messner, has led to an even more 
radical transformation of  war—a fourth informational/psychological dimension has 
been introduced. Since war has begun to include the whole of  society:
‘The soul of  the enemy’s society has become the most important strategic 
objective. [...] Degrading the spirit of  the enemy and saving your own spirit 
from degradation—this is the meaning of  the struggle in the fourth dimension, 
which has become more important than the three other dimensions.’19   
In other words, according to Messner, the increasing involvement of  the masses in 
political and military affairs has made them a primary target, but in the psychological-
informational dimension rather than the physical dimension. With the rising 
importance of  the psychological-informational dimension, the main aim of  war is 
not to capture one’s enemy’s physical territory, but to conquer his spirit to ‘knock him 
down from his ideological positions, to bring confusion and discomfiture into his 
soul’. And the main tools for doing so are propaganda and agitation.20 Analysing the 
rise of  this phenomenon, Messner focused on two main characteristics: ‘propaganda 
by word’ vs. ‘propaganda by deed’ and ‘offensive propaganda’ vs. ‘defensive 
propaganda’.
‘The war of  the 20th century is not a clear military affair: it consists of  politics 
no less than tactics, the space in this war should be conquered by military, 
as well as by propaganda. Today nations can deny physical conquest and 
continue spiritual resistance, even after military capitulation. Through the use 
of  propaganda, one should pour the elixir of  life into one’s own masses and 
poison into the enemy’s, and, by using [positive] propaganda as an antidote, 
[one] should save [ one’s own people] from the enemy’s poison.’21  
17 Messner, Myatezh - Imya Tret'yey Vseminoy, pg. 43.
18 Messner, Lik sovremennoy voyny, pg. 37.
19 Ibid, pg. 5.
20 Messner, Myatezh - Imya Tret'yey Vseminoy, pg. 95.
21 Messner, Lik sovremennoy voyny, pg. 29.
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Discussing the role of  propaganda, Messner differentiated between ‘propaganda by word’ 
and ‘propaganda by deed’. While the first includes radio, official speeches, publications, 
theatre, movies, exhibitions, the latter includes successful and timely actions—‘an idea 
gains credibility when  supported by military, political, social, diplomatic, [and] economic 
achievements’.22 In other words, Messner argued that propaganda is not only what is 
said, written, published, broadcast, but also what is done; ‘in times of  psychological war, 
neither victory in battle, nor territorial gains, are the goals themselves: their main value is 
in their psychological effects’.23 Moreover, ‘propaganda by deed’ is not limited to military 
activities, it also includes successful political, economic, and social actions that can be 
used to influence the psyche of  the masses: ‘a successful general strike increases the self-
confidence of  the working class, [and] the stabilisation of  the national currency increases 
the authority of  the government’.24 
Discussing the differences between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ propaganda and 
agitation, Messner argued that while the former is meant to weaken the enemy, the 
latter is meant to improve morale at home, but ‘it should not be defensive, apologetic, 
[or] justifying; instead it should actively galvanise the emotions and thoughts of  our 
soldiers, warriors and non-warriors’.25 Moreover, ‘the tone of  propaganda should be 
chosen in accordance with the taste [and] psyche of  each nation’, as ‘both defensive and 
offensive propaganda are doomed to fail if  they look like propaganda’.26 Therefore, 
according to Messner, successful propaganda should be both multifaceted—one 
half  true for one’s own masses,  the other for the enemy’s—and suitable:
‘[F]or each level of  consciousness, for each category of  mores, predispositions, 
[and] interests [employing] special logic, sincerity or duplicity, mind-set or 
sentimentality.’27          
According to Messner, the rising importance of  the psychological/informational 
dimension has transformed the nature of  conflict, creating an entirely new type of  
confrontation that he calls subversion-war. Messner defines the main features of  this 
new type of  warfare:
‘When war was a tournament—army against army—it was relatively easy: find 
a large field and fight to destroy the enemy’s formation, try to break force 
with force. Today, in the era of  psychological warfare, neither victory in 
battle, nor territorial gains, are the goals in themselves: their main value is in 
their psychological effects. One should not think of  destroying an enemy’s 
manpower, but of  crushing his psychological power. This is the surest way to 
victory in subversion-war.’28 
22 Messner, Myatezh - Imya Tret'yey Vseminoy, pg. 95; Messner, Lik sovremennoy voyny, p. 30. 
23 Messner, Myatezh - Imya Tret'yey Vseminoy, pg. 91.
24 Ibid., pg. 96.
25 Ibid., pg. 97.
26 Messner, Lik sovremennoy voyny, p. 29.
27 Mesaner, Myatezh - Imya Tret'yey Vseminoy, p. 97.
28 Ibid., pp. 90–91.
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He continues:
‘Waging war is an art. Waging an insurgency (revolution) is also an art. Today, a 
new art is developing—waging a subversion-war. Strategists almost always face 
difficult choices in defining the purpose of  their actions (interim and final). 
In a subversion-war the choice is especially difficult due to the abundance of  
goals and the differences in their significance (either purely psychological, or 
material with a psychological side effect, or purely material).’29
He also defined the hierarchy of  these goals:
‘1) the dissolution of  the spirit of  the enemy public; 2) the defeat of  the 
enemy’s active part (the military, partisan organisations, and violent popular 
movements); 3) the seizure or destruction of  objects of  a psychological value; 
4) the seizure or destruction of  objects of  material value; 5) the creation of  an 
impression of  order to acquire new allies and crush the spirit of  the enemy’s 
allies.’30
Similar to the works of  other Russian émigré authors published abroad, Messner’s 
books and articles reached the USSR—the Russian State Library has all his books in 
original publication—but access to them was definitely restricted to a small number 
of  high level officials and professionals. Only after the end of  the Cold War and the 
dissolution of  the Communist system has there been a growing revival of  Messner’s 
concept of  subversion-war among Russian military thinkers. His works have been 
widely republished since the 1990s as separate books or as articles included in edited 
compilations.31 His anti-Soviet and pro-Western views have been reconceptualised 
for contemporary audiences. From reading Messner’s works, it becomes clear that 
Messner held very conservative views and was an ardent anti-communist, who truly 
believed that ‘Red-Moscow’ and ‘Red-Peking’ were plotting to disintegrate the socio-
cultural and moral fabric of  Western society, which was too weak to fight back. 
Interestingly enough, in their interpretations of  the anti-communist foundations of  
subversion-war in the mid-2000s, some Russian scholars argued:
‘At the end, the Free World, as if  it were listening to the theory and 
recommendations of  Messner and other analysts, understood the danger of  the 
Communist Subversion-War and started to “fight back”, ultimately achieving 
victory.’32
29 Ibid., pg. 94.
30 Ibid.
31 See Savinkin, A. (ed.) ‘Khochesh' mira, pobedi myatezhevoynu! – Tvorcheskoye naslediye E. Messnera’, 
Rossiyskiy Voyennyy Sbornik, Issue 21, (Moscow: Voyennyy Universitet, Russkiy Put', 2005); Messner, Evgeny, 
Vsemirnaya Myatezhvoyna, (Moscow:  Zhukovskoye Pole, 2004); Savinkin, A. (ed.), ‘Russkoye zarubezh'ye: 
gosudarstvenno-patrioticheskaya i voyennaya mysl'’, Voyennyy Sbornik, Issue 6, (Moscow: Gumanitarnaya 
akademiya Vooruzhennykh sil, 1994); Savinkin, A. (ed.), ‘Dusha armii: Russkaya voyennaya emigratsiya o 
moral'no-psikhologicheskikh osnovakh rossiyskoy vooruzhennoy sily’, Voyennyy Sbornik, Issue 13, (Moscow: 
Voyennyy universitet, Nezavisimyy voyenno-nauchnyy tsentr «Otechestvo i Voin», Russkiy put', 1997); Savinkin, 
A. (ed.), ‘Voyennaya mysl' v izgnanii: Tvorchestvo russkoy voyennoy emigratsii’, Voyennyy Sbornik, Issue 16, 
(Moscow: Voyennyy universitet, Russkiy put', 1999).
32 Savinkin, A., ‘Groznaya Opasnost' Vsemirnoy Myatezhevoyny’, in A. Savinkin, (ed.) Khochesh' mira, pobedi 
myatezhevoynu!...
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Or, as one scholar put it: ‘the Messner formula got it right, but in the exact opposite 
way’.33
Due to his anti-communist views and alliance with the White Movement and later 
with Nazi Germany, Messner remained generally unknown in the Soviet Union. 
Only after the end of  the Cold War and the following dissolution of  the Communist 
system has there been a growing revival of  Messner’s concept of  subversion-war 
within the circles of  Russian military thinkers. His books were widely republished, 
and his ideas were adapted to the outcomes of  the Cold War.34 This adaptation 
allowed Russian contemporary thinkers to claim that the West mastered subversion-
war (i.e. psychological/informational warfare) during the Cold War. In other words, 
an analysis of  the contemporary geopolitical situation and ongoing political, 
military, and economic confrontations (e.g. the conflict in the Balkans, the rise of  
terrorist organisations, the Arab Spring, the Ukrainian Crisis) through the prism of  
subversion-war, has allowed Russian scholars to accuse the West (specifically the 
US) of  waging psychological/informational wars as one of  the main methods of  
achieving its political goals in general, and in its relations with Russia in particular.35 
Aleksandr Dugin—Net-Centric War
Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin is a Russian political scientist, philosopher of  geopolitics, 
religious historian, and Slavophile. He began publishing  in the late 1980s and has 
proven himself  to be a talented writer and speaker. Since then he has established 
himself  as a prolific author, publishing almost one book per year, as well as hundreds 
of  articles, commentaries, and interviews, some of  which have been translated into 
English and other languages. In addition, Dugin has held several senior advisory 
positions in the Russian political establishment and served as Head of  the Department 
of  Sociology of  International Relations of  the Lomonosov Moscow State University 
from 2009 to 2014.36
It is not possible to discuss the entire spectrum of  Dugin’s work here, therefore 
this article will highlight several ideas that have contributed to the politicisation 
33 Morozov, E., ‘Predisloviye kommentatora’, in Evgeny Messner, Vsemirnaya Myatezhvoyna, (Moscow:  
Zhukovskoye Pole, 2004), pg. 8.
34 See Savinkin, A. (ed.), Dusha armii: Russkaya voyennaya emigratsiya o moral'no-psikhologicheskikh osnovakh rossiyskoy 
vooruzhennoy sily, (Moscow: Voyennyy universitet, Nezavisimyy voyenno-nauchnyy tsentr ‘Otechestvo i 
Voin’, Russkiy put', 1997); Savinkin, A. (ed.), Russkoye zarubezh'ye: gosudarstvenno-patrioticheskaya i voyennaya mysl, 
(Moscow: Gumanitarnaya akademiya Vooruzhennykh sil, 1994); Messner, Vsemirnaya Myatezhvoyna, (Moscow:  
Zhukovskoye Pole, 2004); Savinkin, A. (ed.), Khochesh' mira, pobedi myatezhevoynu!...
35 See Domnin, I. and A. Savinkin, ‘Assimetrichnoe Voevanie’, Otechestvennyye Zapiski, No. 5, 2005; Pavlushenko, 
M. et al., ‘Myatezhevoyna kak forma tsivilizatsionnogo stolknoveniya Zapad-Vostok’, Obozrevatel'-Observer, No.5, 
2007, pp. 13–19; Biryukov, S. and A. Davydov, ‘Konfliktnaya model' formirovaniya natsional'noy politicheskoy 
identichnosti kontseptsiya “matezhevoyny” E. Messnera (na primere Bosnii)’, Politicheskiye Instituty i Protsessy No. 
2, 2014, pp.132–145; Nesterov, A., ‘Netraditsionnyye ugrozy voyennoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
ramkakh modernizatsii NATO’, Vlast’, No. 5, 2013, pp. 186–188; Morozov, E., ‘Predisloviye kommentatora’; 
Savinkin, A., ‘Groznaya Opasnost' Vsemirnoy Myatezhevoyny’.
36 Nekrasov, S., ‘A. G. Dugin: Nastoyashchiy Postmodern’, Diskurs-Pi 1(1), 2001, pp. 43–52; Darczewska, J., 
The Anatomy of  Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study. Point of  View. Vol. 42. (Warsaw: 
Centre for Eastern Studies, 2014), pg. 14.
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of  the concept of  information warfare in Russian academic discourse. Dugin has 
always been one of  the most prominent advocates of  the idea of  a Russian Eurasian 
civilisation that has unique socio-cultural characteristics, history, and role on the 
global arena.37 For example, Dugin argues that:
‘Russian society is Eurasian, that is partly European and partly non-European, 
and, [therefore] it is generally a unique and distinctive phenomenon. [...] It is no 
accident that we live on this land, within these boundaries. It is no accident that 
these borders were inhabited and settled by us. Between them and us there is 
a direct sociological, cultural, genetic, causal, conceptual, [and] morphological 
relationship.’38
This leads to the second aspect of  Dugin’s conceptualisation—the permanent 
offensive by Western civilization, primarily represented by the US, against the Russian 
Eurasian civilisation. For Dugin: ‘the U.S.A [is] the sum of  the West, its political, 
religious and ideological vanguard [...] the incarnation of  the West, of  Western 
capitalism, its centre and axis, its essence’.39 According to Dugin, Russia has always 
been one of  the most intense enemies of  the West; the struggle between Western 
Protestant civilisation, led initially by the British Empire and then by the US, and 
Russian Orthodox Eurasian civilisation, can be traced throughout hundreds of  years 
of  confrontation, as far back as ancient times:
‘... from the mid-20th century the geopolitical duel, which has been traced 
by geo-politicians down to the ancient conflicts between Athens and Sparta, 
Rome and Carthage, etc., finally crystallised into the collision between the 
Western world (the U.S.A. and Western Europe) and the U.S.S.R., with satellites 
in Europe and Asia.’40     
The third aspect of  Dugin’s ideas, most relevant to the idea of  information warfare, 
is how, in his opinion, the West (mainly the US) has been waging an offensive against 
Russia throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries. In 2007, Dugin published his book 
Geopolitika Postmoderna, in which he presented his interpretation of  the concept of  
network-centric warfare.41 Following the publication of  this book, Dugin continued 
to refine his ideas in a series of  articles42 and other books,43 introducing the term ‘net-
centric wars’ into Russian academic and political discourse. According to Dugin, due to 
the natural evolution of  human civilisation from the agrarian to the industrial periods, 
and on into the Information Age, the American military establishment developed a 
37 Dugin, A., Russkaya Veshch', (Moscow: Arktogeya, 2001); Dugin, A., Filosofiya voyny, (Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 
2004); Dugin, A., Geopolitika Postmoderna, (Saint-Petersburg: Amfora, 2007); Dugin, A., Sotsiologiya geopoliticheskikh 
protsessov Rossii, (Moscow: Lomonosov Moscow State University, 2010); Dugin, A., Russkaya voyna, (Moscow: 
Algoritm, 2015); Dugin, A., Voyna kontinentov—sovremennyy mir v geopoliticheskoy sisteme koordinat, (Moscow: 
Akademicheskiy Proyekt, 2015).
38 Dugin, A., Sotsiologiya geopoliticheskikh protsessov Rossii, pp. 31–32.
39 Dugin, A., Filosofiya voyny, pp. 155–156.
40 Dugin, A., Geopolitika Postmoderna, pg. 16.
41 Ibid., pp. 651–700.
42 See Dugin, A., ‘Teoreticheskiye osnovy setevykh voyn’, Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 1(5), 2008, pp. 2–9; Dugin, 
A., ‘Setetsentricheskiye voyny’, Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 1(5), 2008, pp. 10–16.
43 See Dugin, A., Voyna kontinentov - sovremennyy mir v geopoliticheskoy sisteme koordinat, pp. 240–258.
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new military strategy—net-centric war, which ‘occurs in four interconnected areas 
of  human activity: physical, informational, cognitive, and social’.44  Dugin defines 
the network as the ‘informational dimension, in which major strategic operations are 
developed, as well as their media, diplomatic, economic, and technical support’. Dugin 
claims that the main purpose of  the US is to establish and control such a network in an 
attempt to obtain ‘full and absolute control over all participants of  actual and possible 
military activities, and their total manipulation in all situations—while war is waged, 
when it matures, or when there is peace’.45
According to Dugin, control is first and foremost achieved by absolute superiority in 
the informational dimension, and the main purpose of  the American net-centric war 
is to impress upon the minds of  the populations the idea that military competition 
with the US is pointless and should be avoided. Dugin claims that through the 
informational dimension, Washington attempts to:
‘build a system of  global domination of  the U.S.A. over the whole world, 
i.e. the postmodern analogy of  colonialism and submission, executed under 
new conditions, in new forms and by new means. There is no need for direct 
occupation, a massive deployment of  forces or territorial conquest. [...] 
Network is a much more flexible weapon, it manipulates with violence and 
military power only in extreme cases, [while] the major results are achieved by 
contextual influence in a wide aggregation of  factors: informational, social, 
cognitive, etc.’46
Moreover, Dugin claims that the information dimension has a ‘highly important, 
if  not central, role’ in net-centric wars, as it is ‘the most prevalent environment of  
network wars that has evolved into an independent category—the ‘info-sphere’, 
which stands separately and equal to physical means’.47    
Summarising Dugin’s ideas on net-centric wars, it is important to state that, according 
to him, the US has been waging a persistent and carefully planned offensive against 
Russia in the informational domain as a part of  its net-centric strategy to dominate 
the world in the postmodern Informational Age. This net-centric war, waged against 
Russia by a carefully crafted network, includes:
‘…a Pro-American lobby of  experts, political scientists, analysts, [and political] 
technicians that closely surround [Russian] authorities. A vast number of  
American foundations actively [co]operate, connecting intellectual elites to 
their network. The representatives of  Russian capital and senior officialdom are 
naturally integrated into the Western world, where their savings are kept. The 
means of  mass communication [that] irradiate readers and viewers with flows 
of  visual and semantic information, are built according to Western patterns.’48 
44 Ibid., pg. 246.
45 Ibid., pp. 241–244.
46 Ibid., pp. 248–249.
47 Ibid., pg. 247.
48 Ibid., pg. 250.
73
To withstand this attack, Dugin argues that Russia has to adopt the ‘Eurasian model’, 
which should be in symmetric opposition to the ‘Atlantic-American model’, and will 
create its own network, oriented in precisely the opposite direction. This Eurasian 
network would offer a symmetric response within the informational dimension and 
would be based on:
‘Special groups that would include senior officials, the most passionate cadre of  
different special services, intellectuals, scientists, engineers, political scientists, 
[and] the corps of  patriotically-oriented journalists and culture activists.’49
In other words, according to Dugin, the purpose of  information warfare is to 
influence a network of  people, instructions, foundations, organisations, etc. that 
intuitively (or not) promote a certain set of  ideas to achieve certain political goals. 
The US was the first to master this new type of  warfare, and wages net-centric wars 
against all other countries and nations by manipulating their social processes from 
the inside, thus winning physical confrontations before they even begin. Therefore, 
if  Russia does not ‘postmodernise’ its military, secret services, political institutions, 
information, and communication systems to suit this net-centric struggle, it is 
doomed to lose this war.50
Dugin’s politicisation of  information warfare as a net-centric war waged by the US 
against Russia has been adopted by a large group of  Russian political scientists, 
who find his interpretation of  the historical East-West struggle appealing. Since its 
introduction in 2007, Dugin’s concept of  net-centric war has been used to interpret 
different geopolitical events in the post-Soviet space, claiming that they are all part 
of  the net-centric war waged by the US against Russia, first and foremost in the 
informational domain.51 
Igor Panarin—Information Warfare and the Fall of  the USSR
Igor Nikolaevich Panarin holds a higher doctoral degree in political science and a 
PhD in psychology; he is a full member of  the Military Academy of  Science of  
the Russian Federation, and holds numerous senior advisory and coordinating 
positions within the Russian political establishment. Since the mid-1990s, Panarin 
has published more than 20 books and hundreds of  articles, commentaries, and 
interviews, the vast majority of  which focus on the psychological facets of  warfare 
in general, and on information warfare in particular. While Dugin focuses on the 
49 Ibid., pg. 252.
50 Ibid., pp. 250–258.
51 See Zariffulin, P., ‘Setevaya voyna na Severnom Kavkaze’, Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 2(6), 2008, pp. 37–41; 
Korovin, V., ‘Setevaya voyna Ameriki protiv Rossii na primere Chechni’, Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 2(6), 2008, 
pp. 42–46; Bovdunov, A., ‘Nepravitel'stvennyye organizatsii - setevaya voyna protiv Rossii’, Informatsionnye voyny, 
Vol. 3(7), 2008, pp. 30–39; Savin, L., ‘Ukraina v setevoy voyne’, Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 3(7), 2008, pp. 42–51; 
Kanishchev, P., ‘Setevaya voyna SSHA protiv Rossii - pole boya – Gruziya’, Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 3(7), 
2008, pp. 52-56; Korovin, V., Glavnaya voyennaya tayna SSHA. Setevyye voyny : ‘tsvetnyye revolyutsii’, taynyye zagovory i 
spetsoperatsii, podryvnaya propaganda, ‘promyvaniye mozgov’, voyny 21 veka, (Moscow: Yauza, Eksmo, 2009); Filimonov, 
Kulturno-informatsionnie mekhanizmi vnewnei politiki SSHA, pp.189–206.
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struggle between the West and Russia from the perspective of  political philosophy, 
Panarin has been implicitly focusing on information warfare as the major domain of  
this struggle, claiming that:
‘Since antiquity, the stability of  the political system of  any country has been 
relying on how quickly and completely the political elites receive information 
(e.g. about [possible] danger), and how quickly they respond... Political activity 
[by its definition] is an informational struggle over the control of  the minds of  
the elites and [other] social groups.’52
Analysing the long history of  war, Panarin argues that the informational dimension 
has always played one of  the most decisive roles in human conflict.53 According to 
him, an informational confrontation is:
‘A type of  confrontation between parties, represented by the use of  special 
(political, economic, diplomatic, military and other) methods [based on 
different] ways and means that influence the informational environment of  
the opposing party [while] protecting their own [environment], in order to 
achieve clearly defined goals. [Therefore, t]he major dimensions for waging 
informational-psychological confrontations [are] political, diplomatic, financial-
economic, [and] military.’54
It is important to note that when Panarin mentions these dimensions, he does not 
refer to political, diplomatic, financial-economic, or military activities themselves, 
but rather to the manipulation of  their informational images in order to achieve 
intentional control of  the targeted public opinion so that certain political benefits can 
be gained. According to Panarin, control can be achieved by information manipulation, 
disinformation, fabrication of  information, lobbying, blackmail, or any other possible 
way of  extracting the desired information; or by the mere denial of  information from 
the adversary. Thus, when an information war is waged by one state against another, 
Panarin states, it ‘aims to interrupt the balance of  power and achieve superiority in 
the global informational dimension’ targeting ‘the decision-making processes of  the 
adversary’ by manipulating international and domestic public opinion.55 
Panarin defines three main stages of  information warfare. The first stage is strategic 
political analysis, which includes the ‘collection, aggregation, and exchange of  
information about adversaries and allies for the purpose of  conducting active actions’. 
The second stage, informational influence, is based on ‘infiltration of  negative 
comments and disinformation into the informational domain of  the adversary, as well 
as the suppression of  the adversary’s attempts to get the information that he requires’. 
And the third stage, informational defence, is ‘blocking the disinformation dispersed 
and infiltrated by the adversary’.56  
52 Panarin, I., Informatsionnaya voyna i geopolitika, (Moscow: Pokolenie, 2006), p. 165.
53 See Panarin, I., Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya voyna: razval SSSR, (Saint-Petersburg: Piter, 2010); I. Panarin, 
Informatsionnyye voyna I kommunikatsii, (Moscow: Goryachaya Liniya-Telekom, 2015); Panarin, I. and L. Panarina, 
Informatsionnaya voyna i mir, (Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2003).
54 Panarin, I. and L. Panarina, Informatsionnaya voyna i mir, pp. 20-21.
55 Panarin, I., Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya voyna: razval SSSR, pg. 24.
56 Ibid., pg. 25.
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As Panarin sees it, one of  the most important aspects of  information warfare is the 
fact that it targets the minds of  the political elite and the general population, creating 
favourable public opinion and, therefore, affecting the whole political decision-
making process of  the opposing side. Similar to Dugin, Panarin suggests that, for 
the last several centuries, geopolitics have been dominated by a struggle between 
two main civilisations—the sea-oriented, i.e. the British Empire and the US, and the 
continent-oriented, i.e. Eurasia—Germany and Russia. While this struggle has often 
been expressed in the form of  physical clashes (i.e. wars), these have always been 
accompanied by information warfare before, during, and after the wars.57 Moreover, 
Panarin claims that, during the 20th century, the West—first the British Empire and 
then the US—mastered information warfare, ultimately leading to the dissolution 
of  the Soviet Union as the ‘main cause of  the geopolitical catastrophe of  1991 
was a defeat in the informational war, which lasted for 48 years’.58 According to 
Panarin’s interpretation of  the Cold War, the main informational offence of  the US 
was carried out to compromise and destabilise the Soviet political elite, targeting the 
weakest element of  the Soviet political establishment—the transfer of  power.59 
On the one hand, Panarin highlights the fact that the main reason for the defeat of  
the Soviet Union in this information war (i.e. the Cold War) was the systematic failure 
of  the Soviet political and military establishments, rather than the skilful exploitation 
of  the information domain by the US. On the other, he argues that the war is not 
over; the struggle between the political elites of  the West and Russia did not end in 
1991, and ‘in the 21st century information war is the major tool of  contemporary 
world politics, [and] the dominant way to achieve political and economic power’ – 
Russia continues to be the target of  Western Informational Warfare.60
To avoid the repetition of  the detrimental defeat of  the USSR in the information war 
against the West, Panarin suggests that ‘the existence of  Russia depends on whether 
a new political elite will be formed—a passionate Russian political elite capable of  an 
adequate response to the global challenges of  the 21st century’. This elite, according 
to him, should be based on intellectuals from the liberal arts and sciences, the senior 
leadership of  the security services and military, and the representatives of  big and 
medium capital. The strategic purpose of  this elite should be ‘the formation of  a 
positive global public opinion of  Russia’, since:
‘Only a new Russian political elite, capable of  skilfully conducting the 
geopolitical information confrontation, can create favourable conditions for 
the prosperity and development of  the individual, society and the state, [and] 
to achieve its national and economic interests in the international arena.’61 
Similarly to Dugin, Panarin’s politicisation of  information warfare as the historical 
offense of  the West against Russia that led Russian people to destroy their country 
57 See: Panarin, I., Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya voyna: razval SSSR; I. Panarin, Informatsionnaya voyna i geopolitika; 
I. Panarin, Informatsionnyye voyna I kommunikatsii.
58 Panarin, I., Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya voyna: razval SSSR, pg. 10.
59 See: Panarin, I., Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya voyna: razval SSSR; I. Panarin, Informatsionnyye voyna I 
kommunikatsii.
60 Panarin, I., and L. Panarina, Informatsionnaya voyna i mir, pg. 4.
61 Panarin, I., Informatsionnaya voyna i geopolitika, pp. 244–245.
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twice in the 20th century (the fall of  the Russian Empire in 1917 and the fall of  the 
fall of  the Soviet Union in 1991)62 has found fruitful ground in the Russian academic 
community. During the last decade, numerous articles and books have been using 
Panarin’s concepts and ideas to interpret the deteriorating relations between Russia 
and the West, claiming that Russia has to defend itself  against the informational 
offensive waged by the West.63    
Summarising both Dugin’s and Panarin’s politicisations on information warfare, it is 
important to highlight their four common aspects. First, both claim that the West (first 
the British Empire, then the US) has been continuously and purposefully attempting 
to intervene and undermine the Russian political establishment before, during, 
and after the Cold War (i.e. as a part of  inter-civilisations struggle for dominance). 
Secondly, the West’s major strategy has been information warfare, influencing both 
Russian and international public opinions against the Russian political elite by 
manipulating the flow of  information on political, diplomatic, financial-economic, 
and military affairs. The third aspect is the claim of  both scholars that, in addition 
to the manipulation of  information from the outside, Western strategy is aimed at 
creating a ‘fifth column’ within Russia in an attempt to destabilise Russia from the 
inside. And finally, as an answer to these old-new threats, both scholars argue that 
Russia should nurture its new political elite, which will be patriotic and passionate 
enough to overcome the Western net-centric/information war, making Russia the 
political, cultural, economic, and military centre of  Eurasian civilisation.   
The Politicisation of  Information Warfare in Russia
The political idea expressed by the proponents of  subversion, net-centric or 
information wars waged by the West against Russia to indirectly undermine 
the legitimacy of  the Kremlin through the informational dimension, has 
spread like a bush fire through Russian scholarly circles, and among political 
analysts and commentators. Called by different titles—Hybrid Warfare, 
Controlled Chaos, Colour Revolutions—this idea has been widely discussed 
and promoted by academics, the political elite, and military professionals.64 
62 Panarin, I., Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya voyna: razval SSSR; I. Panarin, Informatsionnaya voyna i geopolitika.
63 Kovalev, V. and S. Malkov, ‘Chto delat', chtoby ne raspast'sya kak SSSR?’, Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 3(35), 
2015, pp. 52–57; Yu. Grigor'yev, ‘Antirossiyskiye Informatsionnyye Voyny’, Informatsionnye voyny, Vol. 4(36), 
2015, pp. 5–11; S. Tkachenko, Informatsionnaya voyna protiv Rossii, (Saint Petersburg: Piter, 2011); Lisichkin, V., L. 
Shelepin, Tret'ya mirovaya informatsionno-psikhologicheskaya voyna, (Moscow: Eskimo-Algoritm, 2003); Novikov, V., 
Informatsionnoye oruzhiye—oruzhiye sovremennykh i budushchikh voyn, (Moscow: Goryachaya Liniya-Telekom, 2011); 
Belyayev, D., Razrukha v golovakh. Informatsionnaya voyna protiv Rossii, (Saint Petersburg: Piter, 2015).
64 See Tsygankov, P.,‘Gibridnyye Voyny’ v khaotiziruyushchemsya mire XXI veka, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo 
universiteta, 2015); Korybko, A., Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change, (Moscow: People’s 
Friendship University of  Russia, 2015); Bocharnikov, I., (ed.), Evolyutsiya form, metodov i instrumentov protivoborstva 
v sovremennykh konfliktakh, (Moscow: Ekon-Inform, 2015); Vladimirov, A., ‘Gosudarstvo, voyna i natsional'naya 
bezopasnost' Rossii’, Prostranstvo i vremya, No. 1, 2011, pp.26-38; Vladimirov, A., ‘Strategiya “organizovannogo 
khaosa”’,  Prostranstvo i vremya, No. 1, 2010, pp.53–57; Manoylo, A., ‘Ukrainskiy Krizis i “Upravlyayemyy 
Khaos”: sled “Tsvetnykh Revolyutsiy” Arabskoy Vesny’, Vlast', No. 4, 2014, pp. 24–28.
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Evaluating the political impact of  this large body of  literature it is difficult to disagree 
with Russian professor Gregory Tulchinsky, who claimed that: 
‘The specific feature of  “information warfare” is the implicitness of  their actors. 
Who is the organiser of  these actions? Against whom are they really directed? 
The ambiguity, regardless their actors, creates a mythicisation of  “information 
wars” and their demonisation. If  one wishes, [he] can trace a motivational chain, 
a “cunning plan”, behind any news [story or] any event that can be attributed 
to some “enemies”. This, of  course, does not deny the fact of  developing or 
implemented plans and projects done by various political and social forces—
both foreign and domestic [...] However, the actors in “information wars” have 
largely become the product of  interpretations and discursive practices, which, in 
turn, can also be regarded as “information warfare”.’65
Conceptualising ongoing discourse about information warfare in Russia, as information 
warfare itself, Tulchinsky stated that ‘it is a conflict, represented in the informational 
dimension, intended to activate some influential group, some institution, people who 
make decisions’.66 Taking into consideration the fact that this discourse has been 
occurring in Russian, it seems right to conclude that the main target of  this politicised 
information war, the Western offensive to destabilise Russia internally, has been Russia’s 
domestic audience—the political elite and the general public. Therefore, to understand 
the level of  this politicisation, it is important to analyse the way in which the ‘Western 
information war against Russia’ is expressed in Russian official political discourse and 
in public opinion.
A brief  analysis of  the contemporary Russian official political discourse shows that this 
narrative of  a ‘Western information war against Russia’ is clearly and openly expressed 
by the Russian leadership. For example, President Vladimir Putin openly claims that:
‘Our diplomats understand, of  course, how important the battle to influence 
public opinion and shape the public mood is these days. We have given these 
issues much attention over recent years. However, today, as we face a growing 
barrage of  information attacks unleashed against Russia by some of  our so-
called partners, we need to make even greater efforts in this direction.’67
Another example is Russian Minister of  Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, who, 
elaborating on the nature of  these attacks, claimed:
‘The destructive [political] line related to the events in Ukraine, the introduction 
of  illegitimate sanctions against Russia, the attempts to punish our country for 
upholding truth and justice, for speaking in defense of  [our] compatriots [in 
Ukraine] ... [all these] led to a serious crisis in our relations with the West.  
65 Tulchinsky, G., ‘Informatsionnyye voyny kak konflikt interpretatsiy, aktiviziruyushchikh “tret'yego”, in  O. 
Malinova, (ed.), Simvolicheskaya politika, Vol.1: Konstruirovaniye predstavleniy o proshlom kak vlastnyy resurs, (Moscow: 
INION RAN, 2012), pp. 251–262; S. Glazunova, G. Tulchinsky, ‘Paradoksal'nost' “informatsionnykh voyn” 
kak reprezentatsii konfliktov v sovremennom obshchestve: v poiskakh “postinformatsionnogo Tret'yego”, in 
Modernizatsiya kak upravlyayemyy konflikt, (Moscow: Izdatel’skii .Dom “Klyuch-S”, 2012), pp. 333–338.
66 Ibid.
67 Putin (2016) Speech at the Meeting of  Russian Federation ambassadors and permanent envoys, Moscow, 30 
June 2016.
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We are faced with a large-scale information war.’68
The adaptation of  these narratives, shaped by the proponents of  the Western 
information offensive, has not simply ended with political speeches made by the 
Kremlin’s leadership. The very same language can be easily found in the Russian 
doctrinal documents that have been amended in recent years. For example, the 
Russian Nation Security Strategy, amended in 2015, states that: 
‘The growing confrontation in the global information space has an increasing 
influence on the character of  the international situation, as an outcome of  
the desire of  some countries to achieve their geopolitical objectives by using 
information and communication technologies, including the manipulation of  
public consciousness and the falsification of  history.’69
Another example is the new version of  the Doctrine of  the Information Security 
of  the Russian Federation, proposed by the Russian Security Council, according to 
which one of  the main threats to Russia is the fact that:
‘The scale of  the use of  information-psychological influences by the special 
services of  certain states is expanding. [These influences] are aimed at 
destabilising the political and social situation in various regions of  the world, 
undermining the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of  other states...The 
informational influence on the Russian population, primarily young people, is 
increasing. [This influence] is aimed at blurring cultural and spiritual values, 
undermining the moral foundations, historical foundations, and patriotic 
traditions of  [Russia’s] multinational people.’70
Moreover, as an outcome of  these changes in doctrinal documents, the Russian 
government successfully passed several laws intended to counteract the alleged 
Western information offensive and protect Russian information space, such as 
the 2012 Federal Law № 121-FZ that restricted the activity of  NGOs that receive 
foreign funding,71 the 2013 Federal Law № 398-FZ that simplified the procedures 
required to block extremist websites, the 2014 Federal Law № 97-FZ that enforced 
governmental supervision on successful websites and blogs, the 2016 Federal Law № 
374-FZ that forced websites to store data concerning their Russian clients within the 
68 ‘Sergey Lavrov: Rossiya stolknulas' s bespretsedentnoy informatsionnoy voynoy’, Russia Today in Russian, 10 
April 2015.
69 Presidential Decree N 683, On the Russian Federation National Security Strategy, Moscow, 31 December 
2015
70 The Security Council of  the Russian Federation, Information Security Doctrine of  the Russian Federation 
(draft), Moscow. 
71 The State Duma, Federal Law N 121-FZ - On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of  the Russian 
Federation regarding the regulation of  the activities of  non-profit organizations that perform the functions of  
a foreign agent, Moscow, 20 July 2012.
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territory of  Russia,72 the 2014 Federal Law  № 305-FZ that limits foreign investment 
in Russian media outlets.73 While this new legislation was followed by a wave of  
critical reactions from international and Russian domestic communities,74 it seems 
that this criticism has had limited consequences and has not been picked up by the 
general public.
While it seems that the politicisation of  information warfare was successfully 
adopted by the Russian government to implement these laws, it is also important to 
examine the level of  influence of  this politicisation on the Russian public. According 
to the public opinion survey done by Levada Center in December 2014, 87% of  
responders said that the West is hostile towards Russia, and 42% of  them claimed 
that this hostility is expressed in the form of  information war. In October 2015, 
these numbers remained similarly high, with 82% believing that the West bears a 
hostile attitude towards Russia, and 44% of  them accusing the West of  waging an 
information war. Interestingly enough, answering the question ‘What does the West 
try to achieve by toughening the sanctions against Russia’ the vast majority answered 
‘To weaken and humiliate Russia’, 71% in September 2014 and 69% in October 
2015, in contrast to only 4% in 2014, and 6% in 2015 who believed that by tightening 
the sanction the West is trying ‘to stop the war, destruction, and people’s deaths 
in Eastern Ukraine’.75 In other words, it seems that Russian people truly believe 
in the narrative that tells the story of  a Western offensive to undermine Russia, 
either by information war, or by sanction, which, according to the proponents of  
the ‘Western subversion/net-centric/information war against Russia’ scenario, are 
also elements of  a general informational offensive. Moreover, the majority of  the 
Russian population believes that the main Russian TV channels are censored by 
the government (69% in February 2014 and 58% in May 2016)76 and in November 
2015 only 41% trusted Russian TV channels as their main source of  domestic and 
international news (down from 79% in August 2009).77 Frequently it seems right 
to argue that the academic community played an equal if  not more powerful role, 
together with the official line of  the political elites, politicising the idea of  information 
war in the eyes of  the Russian public. 
72 The State Duma, Federal Law N 398-FZ - On Amendments to the Federal Law, “On Information, 
Information Technologies and Protection of  Information”, Moscow, 28 December 2013; Federal Law N 97-
FZ - On Amendments to the Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and Protection of  
Information” and Certain Legislative Acts of  the Russian Federation on the regulation of  the exchange of  
information using information-telecommunication networks, Moscow, 21 July 2014;  Federal Law 374-FZ - 
On Amendments to the Federal Law “On Combating Terrorism” and Certain Legislative Acts of  the Russian 
Federation to establish additional measures to counter terrorism and ensure public safety, Moscow, 6 July 2016.
73 The State Duma, Federal Law N 305-FZ - On Amendments to the Law of  the Russian Federation “On 
Mass Media”, Moscow, 14 October 2014.
74 See ‘Internet-kompanii kritikuyut antipiratskiy zakonoproyekt deputatov GD’, Ria-Novosti, 13 June 2013; 
Surnacheva, Y., ‘Ogranichennyye Dumoy’, Kommersant.ru, 29 September 2014; ‘Russian MPs back law on 
internet data storage’, BBCNews, 5 July 2014; ‘Russia: Writers and Academics Speak Out Against Law on 
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75 Levada Center, Reaktsiya Zapada na politiku Rossii: kritika, vrazhdebnost', sanktsii, 2 December 2015.
76 Levada Center, SMI: vnimaniye i tsenzura, 6 June 2016.
77 Levada Center, Novostnyye istochniki i doveriye k nim, 16 December 2015.
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To conclude this analysis of  the politicisation of  information warfare in Russia, it 
seems right to point to the three main groups involved in the process—the academic 
community, the Russian political establishment, and the Russian general public. 
The most interesting question, however, is who has been influencing whom in this 
process?  
Conclusions
Interestingly, when we look at all three aspects of  the process—the politicisation 
of  information warfare directed by its scholarly proponents, the adaptation of  
these narratives by the Russian government and their translation into legal actions 
favourable to the Kremlin, as well as Russian public opinion that generally absorbed 
these ideas and legislation without significant criticism—it is very difficult to separate 
actors and targets. On the one hand, it is possible to assume, as some Western 
analysts propose,78 that Panarin, Dugin, and other scholars who vocally politicise the 
narrative of  the Western information war against Russia, go hand in hand with the 
Russian political establishment, alienating Russian public opinion against the West, 
thus allowing the Kremlin to enforce its grip on power. On the other, the assumption 
that the Kremlin uses these scholars seems to be flawed, as Panarin, Dugin, and the 
revivers of  Messner began promoting their ideas in the 1990s, well before Putin’s 
accession to power. Therefore, it seems right to assume that the politicisation of  
Western Information Warfare against Russia has been directed by these schools of  
thought, and adopted de facto by the political establishment.  
There is, however, another possible explanation. History suggests that the Russian 
people are very proud nation, and in times of  trouble they expect their leaders to 
stand firm and lead them to victory. The Tsarist government during the First World 
War, or the Soviet leaders during the Afghanistan War, did not prove to be a strong 
leadership that deserved to be followed. Witness, Nikolas II was the last Tsar and 
Mikhail Gorbachev—the last Soviet leader.79 Over the last decade, Vladimir Putin 
has proven himself  a student of  history and a very good reader of  Russian cultural 
predispositions. As Dmitri Trenin, director of  the Carnegie Moscow Centre and 
one of  the most outspoken critics of  Putin’s regime, put it: ‘Putin’s main recipe for 
staying in power is to stay in close touch with the bulk of  the people, and anticipate 
emerging trends’.80 From the dissolution of  the Soviet Union to the present day, the 
vast majority of  the Russian population has been lamenting their loss of  power (66% 
in 1992, peaking in 2000 with 75%, and 56% in 2016), with as much as a third of  the 
population believing that the fall of  the USSR could have been avoided (with highest 
percentages of  33% in 2011 and 2016).81 In other words, this sorrow for the lost 
78 See J. Darczewska, The Anatomy of  Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study, Point 
of  View, Vol. 42, (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2014); U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC), ‘Little Green Men’: a Primer on Modern Russian unconventional Warfare, 2013-2014, An unclassified 
version of  the original document, (Fort Bragg, 2016).
79 Trenin, Dmitri,‘Putin’s Biggest Challenge Is Public Support’, Carnegie Moscow Center, 15 January 2015.
80 Ibid.
81 Levada Center, Bol'she poloviny rossiyan sozhaleyut o raspade SSSR, 19 April 2016.
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pride might explain the thirst of  the Russian public for a sound justification of  their 
defeat in the Cold War to Russia’s traditional enemy—the West. Maybe the Kremlin 
does not, in fact, brainwash the Russian people, but simply follows their hearts and 
minds.
Unfortunately, it seems that none of  these explanations is completely right or entirely 
wrong; the eventual truth seems to be somewhere in the middle. Summarising his idea 
of  the politicisation of  information war as information war itself, Tulchinsky concluded: 
‘sometimes the information war [just] repositions a well-known fact, encouraging the 
decision-making process or demonstrating that the decision is maturing or has even 
been made’.82 In other words, the political success of  the narrative of  the Western 
information war against Russia within Russian academic, political, and public spheres 
seems to be the outcome of  many actors who inter-influence one another, participating 
in the same play but for different reasons. Academics want to promote their ideas, 
politicians want to enforce their power, and the general public wants to regain a sense 
of  national pride—rather than a result of  a carefully planned and staged plot of  Putin’s 
regime, as it is frequently presented in the West.       
This article is part of  a research project generously supported by the Gerda Henkel Foundation.
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